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Martial Law in Poland in the Context of International Legal Standards 195 
It is appropriate to stress at this point that obligatio~s under the 
international covenants on human nghts are to be fulfilled by the 
states signatory to these covenants. They alon~ ~an raise the question 
of the failure to abide by these or other provlSlons of the covenants 
by a participating state. The order established by the covenants 
should be observed in the process. Meanwhile, these standards of 
international law are glaringly violated by Western countries, first of 
all, the United States, which are not parties either to the covenants 
on human rights, or to the overwhelming majority of other 
multilateral conventions on rights of man. 
The West-launched anti-Polish 'propaganda aggression,' as 
General J aruzelski called it, constitutes interference in Poland's 
domestic affairs, and is an obvious violation of universally recognized 
standards of international law, including those reaffirmed by the 
Final Act. The discriminatory measures announced against Poland by 
the US, and some of its allies, are against international law. This is 
overt blackmail and pressure, an attem~t to shaken loose the 
peaceful structure of state-to-state relations. 
NOTES 
1. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Final Act, Cmnd. 
6198, London, 1975; Soviet text in Pravda and Izvestiya, 2 August 1975 
2. Ibid. 
3. These Covenants are reprinted in Ian .Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents on 
Human Rights, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1981, pp. 118-45. 
4. Ibid., pp_ 129-30. 
5. This article is supplied by courtesy of Novosti Press Agency. 
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EAST EUROPE'S REACTIONS TO THE POLISH DECEMBER 
STEPHEN BOWERS 
The imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 was a 
depressing though instructive event. The apparent death of the 
wideranging reform movement set in motion by the actions of the 
Solidarity movement seemed, like the crushing of the 'Prague 
Spring', to signify that the prospects for the peaceful pluralist 
evolution of Communist Eastern Europe remained unpromising. 
Official reactions to the 'Polish December' throughout the region 
confirmed that grim prognosis. Relatively independent foreign 
policies and limited, 'liberal' economic reforms might find friendly 
receptions among some of the regional party leaderships from time 
to time, but Solidarity's demands were perceived as pressing well 
beyond the limits of accepted diversity. 
An examination of Eastern Europe's official response to the 
Polish crisis is worthwhile for several reasons. First, it reveals the 
aominant party attitudes on non-party reform movements and how to 
deal with them. The extent to which the various parties viewed 
Solidarity as a threat to socialism is strong evidence that general 
domestic reforms of this nature are not likely to gain official 
acceptance in Eastern Europe in the near future. The largely 
favourable evaluations of the regime's state of emergency indicates 
that the Polish methods might be applied in other nations in the 
unlikely event that they faced a similar crisis. Secondly, such an 
examination is useful because it helps us gauge the degree of unity 
within Eastern Europe on one issue. Obviously, there is not total or 
absolute unanimity, but there is, ~s this study shows, at least a general 
consensus. Thirdly a look at the response of individual countries 
enables one to determine the impact of national considerations -
historical or contemporary - on policies relative to an important 
regional issue. Finally, this examination provides a useful contrast 
with the divided Western reactions to the Polish crisis. While the West 
agonized over a proper response, Eastern Europe, as we will see, 
formulated a relatively concerted one which included a diversity of 
supportive statements as well as an important material relief effort. 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT TO POLISI:I SOCIALISM 
The primary focus of this study is on the reactions of the active 
'Bloc' states - East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
and Romania. Their views on the nature of the threat to Polish 
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statement on 15 December which noted the legitimate concern of 
the . Romanians for the 'baleful evolution of the activity of 
anti-socialist forces' in Poland. The result of this activity was great 
'disorder in economic life', chaos in social and political affairs, and 
serious danger. to Poland's 'progress, freedom, a.nd ~depen~ence'. In 
a more detailed analysis on 26 December, Scznteza explamed th~t 
Poland's problems stemmed from four factors: economIC 
shortcomings, social failings, bad weather, and lastly, 'extremists'. 
While not part of the 'Bloc', Yugoslavia's view: of t~ese events.is 
interesting because it provides an ~dependent _whil~ s~ill con:mumst 
perspectiv~. The Yugoslav leadership flatly rejected the:mot~on that 
the Polish conflict was one in which the counterrevolutIOnarIes were 
on one side and the revolutionaries on the other. Rather, they 
depicted the situation as a stru~gle between t?e 'Polish. wo;king 
class ... and the statist, bureaucratlc, and centralIst monopoly. The 
Yugoslav leadership also suggeste.d that the Sovi~t Union .was 
responsible for many of the negatIve developments In Poland SInce 
1945 and faulted the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) for 
rejecting Solidarity's call for a national plebicite on the country's 
government. The plebicite, they insisted, was a 'chance for the party 
to restore the trust of the working class. ,6 
EVALUATIONS OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY 
The 'Bloc' consensus is somewhat less complete in terms of the 
various estimates of the necessity and success of the Polish state of 
emergency. Yet, they all agreed that some decisive action was 
required and none J' oined in supporting the charges of the renegade 
d . al· , f' 7 Yugoslavs that the martial law or er was In re Ity a state 0 war. 
At the same time, all of the 'Bloc' members consistently refuted 
suggestions by the Italian Communist Party that J aruzelski' s 
government had seriously erred in imposing a state of emergency. 
The norm therefore, was support for martial law, but the 
enthusiasm wi;h which support was given varied. The greatest 
restraint, once again, was exercised by the Stalinist R~manians who 
agreed that martial law was necessary ~ecause the PolIsh people had 
'run out of patience', but softened theIr support for. t?e ~easure by 
suggesting that a 'strengthening of the active partl~IpatIOn o~ the 
working class' would be required before a re~toratIOn of natlO~al 
unity was possible. This assertion appeare~ In .sever~. ~omaman 
publications and must be taken as at least an Implied cnt~cIsm of the 
actions associated with the Polish state of emergency. It IS, however, 
a very limited one and not nearly as fundamental as, for example, .the 
Yugoslav insistence that the 'democratic path' was the appropnate 
one for Poland. 
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The Hungarian response was also fairly restrained in its 
evaluations of martial law. The Hungarian leadership maintained that 
martial law was necessary but cautioned that the 'road leading to 
calm is still a long one.' The party daily observed that the state of 
emergency had, however, 'created the prerequisities for a gradual 
restoration of the economys for reforms, and ensuring public order and strengthening the state.' Politburo member Sandor Gaspar, who 
is also Secretary General of the Hungarian National Trade Union 
Council, nevertheless indicated an official deviation from the 
hardline posture of Hungary's neighbours. Speaking to a national 
television audience, Gaspar identified what many in the Hungarian 
leadership see as one of the main lessons of Poland when he 
explained that the 
... Socialist countries' trade union movement does not have an 
appropriate jurisdiction .... If it operates only according to 
instructions ... , if its task is merely implementing a given policy, ... this 
leads to social conflicts ... This is borne out by the events in Poland.9 
The other Soviet partners in Eastern Europe emphasized not 
only the necessity of December crackdown but also that J aruzelski's 
actions had quickly brought the intended results. The Czechs, East 
Germans, and Bulgarians stressed that martial law was greeted with 
complete calm and understanding by the Poles. Bratislava Pravda 
offered the picture of a Poland in which 
... People are lining up in a disciplined way for bread, milk, meat, and 
other foodstuffs. The supplies of basic foodstuffs are incomparably 
better than prior to the imposition of the state of emergency on 13 
December 1981.10 
A supporting element in this theme was the proposition that the 
indignation of the Polish people was directed not against those who 
imposed severe military rule but rather against the leadership of 
Solidarity. Accordingly, the residents of Czechoslovakia, the GDR, 
and Bulgaria learned that the 'great majority' of the Poles responded 
with 'outrage' upon hearing of the misdeeds of Solidarity activists. 
They were told that the 'masks are falling' as Solidarity's 'secret 
documents' were uncovered and that even Solidarity members were 
'shocked' at the discovery of what their 'bosses' had been preparing 
for the nation. Because of such disclosures, East European readers 
were informed, the Solidarity leaders had lost political support in 
Poland 'rapidly' in the days after December. 
Militant hardliner commentators devoted considerable time to 
supporting the most severe actions taken to suppress dissident 
> 
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elements in Poland. The Czechs and East Germans were most effusive 
in praising the efforts of the PUWP to 'cleanse itself' of those who 
had presumably betrayed it in the final critical mont~s ~efore 
December. Arrests of the 'ringleaders of counterrevolutIOn were 
reported as an encouraging sign that the Polish situa~ion was 
returning to normal. With the rising number of dete:ntIOns, the 
Czechs and East Germans insisted with greater confIdence that 
Poland's public life was 'easing' .. Yet, even in the ~a~e of such 
optimistic accounts, words of cautIOn and a call for vI~ance .were 
extended. The need for caution and vigilance was explamed m an 
editorial in Bratislava Pravda on 16'January 1982 which insisted that 
the 'enemies of socialist renewal ... are not lowering their weapons.' 
Passive resistance by stubborn Solidarity supporters ~d even 
bombings were the evidence cited in support of this admomtIOn. The 
Wujek mine incid~nt in mid-December 1981 a~d ~ther effo:rts by 
Solidarity to maintain an 'atmosphere .of tenSI?n . s~rved, ~n the 
Czech view, as justification for the warnmg t~at It IS ~mpos,sIble to 
conduct a discussion with the inveterate enemIes of sOCIalIsm. These 
East European observations parallel those of Leonid Zamyatin, head 
of the International Information Department of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU, who insisted on Moscow's 'Studio-9' 
television show on 27 February 1982 that the Polish 
counterrevolution had been 'stopped, but it has not been eradicated.' 
ANSWERING THE WEST 
Thus, in the view of most East European authorities, a new danger 
emerged following the imposition of martial law: an intensified but 
desperate Western campaign to save the Polish counterrevolution. 
The Western powers, according to official media, responded with 
bitterness and frustration upon seeing their subversive plans 
thwarted. The leadership of Eastern Europe explained that the 
Western response to martial law was not motivated by any real 
concern for the Polish people but rather by a desire to return to the 
'cold war'. The Czech diatribes were the most abusive and started 
with the proposition that the Western powers had wanted a 
'reactionary, anti-Soviet Poland' ever since the Yalta conference. The 
American reaction to the latest frustration of that desire was 
presented as nothing less than a 'frontal rectionary offesive' against 
all progressive forces. In fact, what President Reagan wanted to gain 
out of the Polish difficulties was held to be a restoration of the 
'privileged position of power for American imperalism'. Reagan, 
they charged, wanted to reverse the 'defeats and failures' of the era 
of detente by returning to the policies of confrontation. On 
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16 January 1982, Rude Pravo accused the United States and its 
NATO allies of setting the stage for a dangerous confrontation by 
moving troop exercise areas closer to the borders of the Warsaw Pact 
nations. The East Germans supplemented these charges with their 
denunciation of a 'virulent anti-Polish campaign' being mounted in 
We~t Ge~any, while Bulga?a accused the United States of dietating 
to ItS allIes and transformm!f Western Europe into a 'satellite of 
American political thought'. 1 When the lack of Western unity 
became apparent, East European official statements gleefully noted 
increasing resistance to U S pressures for sanctions against the martial 
law regime in Poland and against the Soviet Union. By February 
1982, reports frequently commented on the 'isolation' of the United 
States and the refusal of Western Europe to join a new 'cold war'. 
With the introduction of specific proposals for sanctions against 
the USSR and Poland, even the relatively moderate Romanians 
joined the chorus of critics of the West. Prior to this 
time, the Romanians had limited themselves to a general call for 
non-interference, presumably applicable to East and West alike. 
Nevertheless, their criticisms were restrained and much less sweeping 
that those of their neighbours. For example, Scinteia ignored 
suggestions about the American appetite for confrontation and 
simply commented that sanctions 'do not help' the process of 
normalization but simply raise 'fresh obstacles' to a resolution of the 
crisis. The most pointed criticism by the Romanians was the 
accusation that the United States was guilty of hypocrisy for 
supporting Latin American regimes like Chile while professing moral 
outrage at the establishment of a military dictatorship in Poland. 
THE EAST EUROPEAN RELIEF MISSION FOR POLAND 
Contributions to the international debate over the Polish problem, 
however satisfying they might have been to the political position of 
the J aruzelski government, by themselves did little to relieve Polish 
suffering. Recognizing this, Poland's neighbours joined in a relief 
mission for their embattled ally. This effort is especially noteworthy 
because it came at a time when the Western nations found themselves 
seriously divided over specific steps to be taken in response to the 
Polish crisis. 
The East German effort was the best organized and most 
productive contribution to this campaign. With very thorough media 
orchestration, the East German programme made precise ideological 
and political points while also alleviating Polish hardships. A special 
account for the Polish relief fund was set up at the East Berlin 
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savings bank and potential contributors were reminded that 
'donations confirm an int.ernationalist affinity.'12 Czechosl.ovakia, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania made similar if less elaborate 
contributions of food and clothing to the support of the Polish 
population. 
The East European relief programme went beyond simple 
charity as could be seen from the series of trade protocols signed in 
January and.February 1982. On this matter, unanimity has appeared 
to be the rule as Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary all 
signed similar trade agreements with Poland in a three week period. 
During the same time, the GDR was negotiating for such an 
agreement and even the non-'Bloc' League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia held discussions with the PUWP on ways of improving 
cooperation between the two organizations on a broad range of 
issues. During the week of 25 January 1982, the CMEA Commission 
for Cooperation in Planning held a series of talks between 
representatives of the ten member states for the purpose of 
developing a multilateral assistance programme to help Poland 
overcome its economic difficulties. The Commission's closing 
statement emphasized that such a programme was vital because of 
the policies being pursued by the United States and some of the 
NATO governments vis-a-vis Eastern Europe. 
THE MEANING OF EASTERN EUROPE'S REACTIONS TO THE CRISIS 
On balance, Eastern Europe's reactions to the Polish crisis have been 
fully supportive of the positions taken by the J aruzelski government. 
The consensus which emerged in the period after the crackdown on 
Solidarity was a consistent if uneven one. The most obvious conclusion 
from an examination of official responses during this time is that 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany exhibited the most intensely 
dogmatic attitudes within the region. Different circumstances 
compelled both regimes to adopt policies characterized by an 
extreme hostility toward the Polish reformers and their Western 
sympathizers. Some observers have suggested that the traditional 
Prussian view of the Poles as 'rabble' is one factor explaining the 
GDR's policy. The insecurity from which East Germany has suffered 
as a consequence of its 'front-line, divided nation' status is certainly 
another. The prospect of geographical isolation as a result of a Polish. 
'heresy', however remote it might be, must have been distressing to 
East Berlin. The GDR's unannounced state of emergency in January 
1982 was a graphic illustration of the depth of the nation's concern. 
The Czech reaction can be explained by at least two 
,considerations. The first is official concern about a Polish 'contagion' 
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that might have rekindled some of the spirit of 1968. Ironically it is 
those who did not remember the 'Prague Spring appear'to have been 
most sympathetic towards the Poles. Older Czechs knew of the 
brutal lessons of the Czech normalization and may have felt, if 
anything, a certain satisfaction that the Poles apparently did not 
succeed where they had failed. A second factor is Czech resentment 
of Polish participation in the 1968 jnvasion .and the Polish occupation 
of Northern Moravia in 1938-39. Therefore, most Czechs have little 
reason to sympathize with Polish reformers, and the hardline 
position serves the needs of the Czech 'normalizers' in power and at 
the same time is compatible with much popular sentiment. 
Bulgaria's traditional pro-Russian attitudes and the leadership's 
consistently doctrinaire inclinations support its inclusion among the 
most enthuasiastic supporters of martial law. However, its distance 
from Poland and the absence of any strong liberal-reformist periods 
of rule reduce the intensity and attention that the authorities 
devoted to rhetoric about the Polish crisis. Hungary also remained 
among the hardliners on the Polish events although its support was 
sometimes inconsistent. The Hungarian departures from orthodoxy 
were most apparent in discussions of the role of the trade unions in 
socialist states. The bitter experiences of 1956 and the country's 
successful but painful rebuilding of labour relationships must have 
inspired a genuine concern for the prospects of a reform movement 
that did not seem to recognize its limitations. 
Of the member states of the 'Bloc', only Romania demonstrated 
any consistent inclination toward moderation in its assessments of 
Polish events. Romania's frank and balanced assessment of Polish 
problems - and the placing of 'extremists' no more than fourth in 
order of importance - indicates at least some willingness to defy the 
dominant line. However, at best, the Romanian stance demonstrated 
only a limited independence; on the most fundamental questions, the 
Romanians generally supported the positions of their allies. 
Thus, the conclusion that must be drawn from an examination 
of East European responses to the Polish crisis is that orthodoxy 
prevails throughout the Warsw Pact region. Pluralism is an operative 
factor but its impact does not extend to a defiance of what is 
supposed to be the proper relationship between the ruling party 
and other political institutlons. Social, cultural, and econorrlli: 
diversity is present but does not point in the direction of major 
independerident reform movements. The consistently critical 
perceptions of Solidarity's impact on Polish socialism reveals a clear 
understanding by the party leaderships of the need for the 
authorities to retain control of any significant social or political 
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endeavours. Their evaluations of the necessity for and progre~s of the 
state of emergency shows a general agreement on the reqUIred an? 
acceptable methods of retaining or re?aining ~ontrol over domestIc 
developments. In addition, the exceptIOnal umty o~ t?e resp~nse.to 
Western proposals for sanctions demonstrates the lImIts of. qwersity 
in international affairs when the party's methods of domestIc control 
are at issue. 
Finally the concerted relief programme serves to further the 
conception ~hat the Warsaw Treaty Organiz~tion states co.n~tit~te a 
cohesive community bound by 'an inten:atlOnal cl~ss. aff~mty and 
exhibiting an active concern for the trIals and dIffIcultIes of all 
member-states. 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
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MYTH AND REALITY IN RECENT SOVIET FICTION 
MAR Y SETON- WATSON 
Soviet 'official' fiction of the last ten to fifteen years is of interest 
for several reasons unrelated to its literary value. For Sovjet citizens, it 
is a very useful barometer by which to measure the internal political 
climate and on which to base conjectures about likely trends for the 
immediate future. And for foreigners interested in the Soviet Union, 
it Car): provide startling insights into the mental outlook as well as the 
physical circumstances of ordinary Soviet citizens. The 'official' 
fiction is however largely ignored by Western students of the USSR. 
Partly this is because so many good books by Russian emigre writers 
have appeared in English in recent years (particularly the satirical 
works of Voinovich and Zinoviev) that these uncensored authors are 
felt to have a monopoly of the truth about their native land. Partly it 
is because many Soviet novels and stories are long-winded, with 
stereotyped characters and predictable plots: English publishers are 
not interested in having them translated, and few English students of 
Russian are prepared to devote time to reading them. Yet even the 
dullest of these recent novels often contai.ns scenes apparently taken 
straigh~ from Soviet daily life. Some of the scenes d-escribe life as it 
really is, with accuracy and in detail; in other books the real-life 
scenes are prettified, and show life as the authors would like it to be. 
Both the reality and the myth convey much about the quality of 
Soviet existence. 
( i) 
An ex<).mple of stark reality is a recent story by Yuri Nagibin about 
that comparatively new Soviet phenomenon, the hit-and-run private 
car-driver. Two professional couples, a Leningrad architect and a 
Moscow scientist with their wives, are driving back to Moscow from 
holiday along a main road. Suddenly an old man on a moped shoots 
out of a side-road in front of them: 
'Olga, sitting in the back seat of the car, saw the old man knocked 
down as though it was happening on the television screen, not in real 
life ... Somehow she got out of the car, and was sick by the 
roadside... The first voice she heard was her own, hysterically 
demanding that they take the old man to a hospital. Someone trod 
painfully on her foot, but she went on shouting about the hospital, 
until Igor seized her by the elbow and dragged her back to the car. 
She resisted him, continUing to shout, while he hissed "Shut up, you 
fooll", his eyes white w;ith fury. Sudd~ly she gave up and l!lIowed 
herself to be bundled back into the hateful car, where she burst into 
